Abstract. We propose CoreTuLiP -the core of a trust management language based on Logic Programming. CoreTuLiP is based on a subset of moded logic programming, but enjoys the features of TM languages such as RT; in particular clauses are issued by different authorities and stored in a distributed manner. We present a lookup and inference algorithm which we prove to be correct and complete w.r.t. the declarative semantics. CoreTuLiP enjoys uniform syntax and the well-established semantics and is expressive enough to model scenarios which are hard to deal with in RT.
Introduction
Trust management (TM) [6, 8, 13, 15] is an approach to access control in decentralised distributed systems where access control decisions are based on policy statements issued by multiple principals, and stored in a distributed manner. Policy statements are often digitally signed to ensure their authenticity and integrity; such statements are sometimes called credentials or certificates, and -in many cases -can be represented as datalog clauses. Indeed, like in logic programming, in TM credentials often have to be combined together to provide an authorisation proof (e.g. a proof that a given user has indeed access to a given resource).
One of the features of TM advocated in e.g. [16] (w.r.t. classical decentralised access control, but also w.r.t. logic programming) is distributed storage: in practice credentials may or may not be stored by the authority who issues them; therefore one of the prominent problems of TM is that of guaranteeing that -under reasonable circumstances -if there exists a proof of a certain (authorisation) statement, then it is also possible to find the credentials needed to construct the proof itself.
To date, one of the most successful TM systems is the RT family, defined by Li, Winsborough and Mitchell [15, 16] . This family of languages enjoys a well-defined LPbased declarative semantics, a syntax similar to that of SDSI [8] , and offers the possibility of storing credentials either by the issuer (the authority issuing them) and/or by the subject (the entity the credential "refers to"). The location where the credential is stored is determined by the so-called type of the credential. Li et al. show that if all credentials are well-typed then there exists a terminating credential chain discovery algorithm which ines whether a given statement is valid in the present state.
Although the RT family is successful in achieving its goals, we believe that it presents drawbacks which are worth investigating and improving. In particular, RT syntax is inflexible to the extent that to accommodate natural things such as separation of duty etc., one has to resort to a number of rather artificial extensions (RT 1 until RT D , and RT T ), which are difficult to grasp and use. Secondly, it cannot be linked naturally with external languages. Finally, while it enjoys a declarative reading, this reading does not reflect the crucial type information.
One could speculate that to solve these problems one should simply translate RT into Logic Programming, and then use the latter to specify and prove authorisation statements. This is however inaccurate, as this translation would lose one of the essential elements that make RT a trust management language, in particular the information concerning where credentials should be stored and how they can be found when needed.
In this paper we present CoreTuLiP, which is the stripped-down version of the TuLiP (Trust management system based on Logic Programming) system we are developing at the University of Twente in the context of the I-Share project [12] . CoreTuLiP is basically a subset of (function-free) moded logic programming, with the essential additional feature that the clauses are not stored at a central authority, but are distributed across the different principals involved in the system. The mode information determines where a clause will be stored and a form of well-modedness is used to guarantee that, as the computation progresses, enough information is available to find the clauses needed to build a proof of the query being evaluated. Since credentials are distributed, CoreTuLiP is not amenable to SLD resolution, and requires a mix of top-down and bottom up reasoning. Here, we present a terminating algorithm which is able to answer well-moded queries, together with the soundness and completeness result. Finally, we show that RT 0 , the core language of the RT family, is basically equivalent to a subset of CoreTuLiP. Doing so, we prove that it is possible to define a true trust management language which is as expressive as RT 0 also in terms of credential distribution without giving up the established LP formalism.
CoreTuLiP, is also based on LP, but has a more flexible underlying syntax than RT, and can easily accommodate extensions. For instance, it allows one to express thresholds and separation of duties, which require special additions to RT 0 . This paper is structured as follows: in Sect. 2 we introduce the basics of moded Logic Programming. In Sect. 3 we introduce CoreTuLiP. In Sect. 4 we present the Lookup and Inference AlgoRithm, and we show that it is sound and complete w.r.t. the standard LP semantics. In Sect. 5 we compare RT 0 with CoreTuLiP. Finally, in Sect. 6 we present the related work and then we conclude the paper and propose future research in Sect. 7.
Preliminaries on Logic Programs
The reader is assumed to be familiar with the terminology and the basic results of the semantics of logic programs [1, 17] . Here, we refer to function-free (Datalog-like) logic programs and we adopt the notation of [1] . We denote atoms by A, B, H 
=⇒ P,cn+1 B n+1 · · · of derivation steps is called an SLD derivation of P ∪ {B 0 } provided that for every step the standardisation apart condition holds, i.e. the input clause employed at each step is variable disjoint from the initial query B 0 , and from the substitutions and the input clauses used at earlier steps. If δ is maximal and ends with the empty query (B n = ) then the restriction of θ to the variables of B is called its computed answer substitution (c.a.s., for short).
Moded Programs. Informally speaking, a mode indicates how the arguments of a relation should be used, i.e. which are the input and which are the output positions of each atom, and allows one to derive properties such as absence of run-time errors for Prolog built-ins and absence of floundering for programs with negation [3] . Most compilers encourage the user to specify a mode declaration. If m p (i) = In (resp. Out), we say that i is an input (resp. output) position of p (with respect to m p ). We assume that each predicate symbol has a unique mode associated to it; multiple modes may be obtained by simply renaming the predicates. We use the notation (X 1 , . . . , X n ) to indicate the mode m in which m(i) = X i . For instance, (In, Out) indicates the mode in which the first (resp. second) position is an input (resp. output ) position. To benefit from the advantage of modes, programs are required to be well-moded [3] : they have to respect some correctness conditions relating the input arguments to the output ones. We denote by In(A) (resp. Out(A)) the sequence of terms filling in the input (resp. output) positions of A, and by Var In(A) (resp. Var Out(A)) the set of variables occupying the input (resp. output) positions of A. Note that the first atom of a well-moded query is ground in its input positions and a variant of a well-moded clause is well-moded. The following Lemma, due to [2] , shows the "persistence" of the notion of well-modedness. 
Definition 1 (Mode

Definition 2 (Well-Moded
). A clause H ← B 1 , . . . , B n is well-moded if ∀ i ∈ [1, n] Var In(B i ) ⊆ i−1 j=1 Var Out(B j ) ∪ Var In(H),
Core TuLiP
We now introduce CoreTuLiP, which in first approximation is a variant of moded LP. In CoreTuLiP, there are two disjoint types of predicates: (user-defined) credential predicates and built-in constraint predicates. In CoreTuLiP, -credential predicates have arity two; -in an atom with a credential predicate, we call the term filling in the first argument position the issuer, and the one filling in the second argument position the recipient. -a credential is a clause defining credential predicate. Then, the issuer of a credential is the term filling in the first argument position of the head.
(the relations with the notions of issuer and subject used in RT are discussed in Sect. 5).
In the full version we are going to have credential predicates with more arguments and user defined predicates as well. These additions are, however, immaterial for this paper.
Example 1.
To access a project document at the University of Twente (UT) one must be either a project member and a Ph.D. student at the UT or at one of the partner universities, or be approved by two different assistant professors from the UT. John and Jeroen are assistant professors at the UT. John states that a project member from one of the partner universities can access the document if she is approved by at least one project member who is also an associate professor at that university. Jeroen approves anyone who is also approved by a project leader at the UT. Sandro is a project leader at the UT.
charles). project_member(P, X).
prof (ut, john) .
jeroen). approve_access(A, X), project_partner(ut, ut). associate_prof(P, A), (c 10 ) project_partner(ut, tud). project_partner(ut, P ), project_member(tud, jeffrey). project_member(P, A), project_member(tud, rico). project_member(P, X).
In TM, credentials are always issued by some authority (for the sake of simplicity here we identify authorities with the set of ground terms). In Example 1, the credential prof(ut, john) is issued by ut (University of Twente), and has john as the recipient. With this credential, ut states that john is one of the professors at the University of Twente. In a practical setting, this credential is signed by ut, and ut and john are placeholders for the implementation dependent identifiers (like public keys or URIs). Under these assumptions, it is natural to expect that the issuer of a credential should be a ground term.
. , B n be a clause. We say that cl is well-formed if it is well-moded and issuer(H) is a ground term.
Modes and Decentralised Storage. Credential predicates have three legal modes: (In, In), (In, Out), and (Out, In). The reason why the mode (Out, Out) is considered illegal is that it would allow queries with completely uninstantiated arguments like prof(X, Y ), in which neither the issuer nor the recipient is specified. Unlike in LP, such queries cannot be answered in a TM system because the system does not know where to look for relevant credentials, which could be issued and stored by any authority. By requiring that at least one of the arguments be input, and that the credentials be traceable (see below) we will be able to find the credentials we need to construct the proofs we need. For constraint predicates the only legal mode is the one "all-input" (In, . .
. , In).
A peculiar feature of trust management systems is that credentials are stored in a distributed way. For instance, in Example 1, the credential prof(ut, john) which is issued by ut could be stored by either ut or john. Storing it by john has the advantage that john does not have to fetch the credential at ut every time he needs it, which in a highly distributed system may be costly. We call the depositary of a credential the authority where the credential is stored. In CoreTuLiP, it is the mode of the credential's head which determines its depositary (here, we allow only one mode per relation symbol, so credentials will be stored at one place only; by allowing multiple modes we lift this limitation in the extended system). Returning to Example 1, if mode(prof) is either (In, In) or (In, Out), then the credential prof(ut, john) will be stored at ut, otherwise (if the mode is (Out, In)), john will store it. Storing the credential at some other place would make it unfindable. The definition below generalises this concept. The declarative semantics of a state is simply given in terms of logic programming as follows (where for simplicity we assume that all constraints are user-defined) Definition 6. Let P be the state {(a 1 , P 1 ), . . . , (a n , P n )}, and A be an atom -We denote by P (P) the set of clauses P 1 ∪ · · · ∪ P n . We call P (P) the LPcounterpart of state P. -We say that A is true in state P iff P (P) ∪ C |= A, where C is a first order theory determining the meaning of credential predicates.
Definition 4 (Traceable, Depositary
-mode(B 1 ) = . . . = mode(B k ) = (Out, In), -In(H) = In(B 1 ), -In(B i+1 ) = Out(B i ),
The Lookup and Inference AlgoRithm (LIAR)
The goal of an authorisation system is to check whether a fact is true in a given state. Since the state P can be very large and distributed across different agents, it is essential to have an algorithm which takes care of computing whether a given query is true in P without having to collect the entire P (P). An extra difficulty comes from the fact that clauses might easily be mutually recursive, and that cases 2 and 3 of Definition 4 make it impossible to follow a straightforward top-down reasoning. In this section we present a suitable algorithm. Before we proceed we need the following definitions. Let A be an atom and S be a set of atoms. We adopt the following conventions:
Definition 7 (Connected). We say that two atoms
A is a renaming of A). Fig. 1 . The Lookup and Inference AlgoRithm (LIAR). We assume that dummy is a reserved predicate symbol, with mode (Out , In). Statements in boxes are optional and included only for optimisation purposes.
The algorithm maintains three stacks: CLSTACK contains the set of clauses collected so far, FACTSTACK contains the set of atomic logical consequences inferred from CLSTACK, and GOALSTACK contains the set of atomic goals already processed (to handle loops). Additionally, the VISITED stack contains the set of entities that have been visited during the processing. Initially, CLSTACK contains a single clause constructed from the initial atomic query A; the other stacks are empty. The algorithm is divided in two phases. Phase 1 contains the credential discovery. First, it selects a new well-moded atom Cθ from the body of a clause in CLSTACK and then, depending on its mode, it fetches the new credentials from either issuer(Cθ) or recipient(Cθ). The fetched credentials are then added to the CLSTACK. Notice that, when mode(C) = (Out, In), all clauses whose head has mode (Out, In) must be fetched from recipient(Cθ), and not only the clauses whose head unifies with Cθ. This is because in this case one does not know which credentials may be needed to prove Cθ, yet. To overcome this problem, the algorithm overestimates and fetches all credentials with the right mode being stored at recipient(Cθ). In Phase 2, the model of the set of clauses in the CLSTACK is build bottom-up. Newly inferred facts are added to the FACTSTACK. For the facts having mode (Out, In), the algorithm adds a dummy clause to CLSTACK, so that the "subject traceable" chains can be discovered properly. The algorithm extends naturally to queries containing more than one atom. The following results show that LIAR algorithm is sound and complete w.r.t. the standard LP semantics, i.e. the centralised algorithm based on the SLD resolution. All proofs are reported in [9] . We need the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let P be a state and FACTSTACK be the result of the algorithm execution for some well-moded query. Let A be an atom in FACTSTACK. Then A is ground.
The soundness result is rather straightforward.
Theorem 1 (soundness). Let P be a state and FACTSTACK be the result of executing LIAR on P and a well-moded query. Then ∀A ∈ FACTSTACK, P (P) |= A.
Proof. It is easy to see that, by construction, if an atom A is added to FACTSTACK, then CLSTACK |= A. Since ∀c ∈ CLSTACK c is an instance of a clause c ∈ P (P), it follows that P (P) |= A.
The following completeness result guarantees among other things that -after executing LIAR on a state P and some well-moded query -for any goal A ∈ GOALSTACK it holds that if there exists a successful SLD derivation of A in P (P) with c.a.s. θ then
Theorem 2 (completeness). Let P be a state and then FACTSTACK, GOALSTACK be the result of executing LIAR on P and a given well-moded goal. Then ∀C ∈ GOALSTACK, if ∃ a successful SLD derivation
δ : C θ −→ P (P) then C θ → FACTSTACK.
CoreTuLiP vs. RT 0
In this section we are going to compare CoreTuLiP with the well-established RT 0 trust management language. We are going to show that -in most respects -CoreTuLiP is at least as expressive as RT 0 . To this end, we first present a slightly simplified (yet expressively equivalent) version of RT 0 as given in [16] : A principal is a uniquely identified individual or process. A principal can define a role, which is indicated by a principal's name followed by a role name, separated by a dot. For instance a.r, and alice.pictures are roles. For the sake of uniformity, we depart from [16] 
SP(a.r ← d)) = m(a, r, d)
. The Type System of RT 0 . To ensure traceability, RT 0 comes with a type system [16] . In the original presentation, each role name has two types: an issuer-side type and a subject-side type. Here -also for the sake of simplicity -we assume that each role has just one of the following three type values: issuer-traces-all (ITA), issuer-traces-def (ITD), and subject-traces-all (STA). To extend the results we present here to the full version (i.e. including all possible combinations of RT 0 types), we need to extend Core TuLiP in a straightforward way by allowing predicates with multiple modes.
Concerning storage, if a role name r is issuer-traces-all or issuer-traces-def, then principal a has to store all the credentials defining a.r. When a role name r is subjecttraces-all then a credential of the form a.r ← e, must be stored by every subject of this credential. The successful discovery requires that each credential in the policy S be well-typed. For the sake of simplicity, we use the following definition of well-typed credentials (equivalent to [16] ). Table 1 . Three Sorts of Goals. If the set of credentials S is well-typed then there exists a terminating algorithm supporting three sorts of goals. 
Definition 9. Let c be an RT 0 credential. We say that c is well-typed iff the combination of type value assignments appears as a valid entry in
Translating RT 0 into CoreTuLiP
We now demonstrate that CoreTuLiP is -in most cases -more expressive than RT 0 by showing that an arbitrary RT 0 policy can be translated in a straightforward way into an equivalent CoreTuLiP state. First, we define a mapping T from RT 0 to CoreTuLiP. The following theorem shows that, from the view point of the declarative semantics, S and T (S) are equivalent (recall that m is the fixed predicate symbol used in SP(S)). The proof can be found in [9] . r(a, d) .
Definition 10. Let c be an RT 0 credential. Then T (c) is defined as follows:
This shows that each RT 0 policy can be translated into a declaratively equivalent CoreTuLiP state. Now, to prove the full equivalence we still have to prove two things, namely that (a) if an RT 0 credential is stored at principal a then its corresponding CoreTuLiP statement is stored at a as well, and that (b) the CoreTuLiP system can answer the same goals the RT 0 system can. We start with the following proposition proven in [9] .
Proposition 1. Let c be an RT 0 credential. (a) If c is stored at a then T (c) is also stored at a. (b) If c is a well-typed then T (c) is traceable.
At last, we have to show how RT 0 goals can be transformed into (legal, i.e. well-moded) CoreTuLiP queries. Since RT does not have a formal notation to express goals we have to be a bit verbose. , b) , where X and Y are variables). There are two reasons why we believe that this limitation of CoreTuLiP w.r.t. RT 0 is hardly relevant in practice: first, RT 0 allows to express the query, but it is not able to give a complete answer in any case: it can only find all such a.r which are also subject traceable. Secondly (also because RT 0 is not able to provide a full answer), this kind of goal is not used in practice on their own, but only as a subgoal of the goals of Sort 2.
The syntactic inability of CoreTuLiP to express goals of Sort 3 is actually a conscious design choice we made to keep the syntax manageable (to express goals of this sort we would need a "polymorphic" mode system in which the actual mode of an atom does not only depend on its predicate symbol but also on some of its arguments). Actually, our LIAR algorithm would be able to answer such queries as well. Summarising, Theorem 3, Proposition 1, and Remark 1 allow us to say that CoreTuLiP is at least as expressive as RT 0 , with the small exception of the goals of Sort 3. In proving this, we have made the restrictive assumption that an RT 0 role name has just one of the following three types: ITA (issuer-traces-all), ITD (issuer-traces-def), or STA (subject-traces-all). The extension to the full version (i.e. including all possible combinations of RT 0 types) can be done in a straightforward way by extending Core TuLiP so that it allows predicates with multiple modes.
A Flexible Syntax
As we said already, CoreTuLiP is simply the core language of the TM system we are developing. The full language will allow credentials with more than two arguments and user defined predicates. Nevertheless, CoreTuLiP is already expressive enough to express complex policies (like thresholds or separation of duty) that in RT require the adoption of special operators (which are present in more expressive members of the RT family RT 1 , RT 2 , RT T , or RT D ). Consider for instance the following statement taken from [15] "a says that an entity is a member of a.r if one member of a.r 1 and two different members of a.r 2 all say so". This policy cannot be expressed in RT 0 , and to express this in RT one needs to use the so-called manifold roles, which extend the notion of roles by allowing role members to be collections of entities (rather than just principals). This is done in RT T by defining the operators and ⊗. In CoreTuLiP, on the other hand, this policy can be expressed quite naturally with the following one line:
Notably, to express this, we don't have to use manifold-like structures which are, in our opinion, rather hard to grasp.
Related Work
The term "trust management" was first coined by Blaze, Feigenbaum, and Lacy [7] as an answer to the inadequacy of traditional authorisation mechanisms based on identitybased public-key systems like X.509. X.509 strongly depends on a centralised hierarchy of certificate authorities (CA), which significantly restricts the possible application area in the distributed heterogeneous systems. In their work, Blaze et al. identify various requirements that a trust management system should satisfy and they introduce PolicyMaker -a trust management engine fulfilling these requirements. A direct descendant of PolicyMaker is KeyNote [5] . The reader can find a comparison of PolicyMaker and KeyNote in [6] .
Clark et al. developed SDSI/SPKI [8] that combines local namespaces and the corresponding name certificates of SDSI [20] with authorisation certificates of SPKI [10] . They present a TM language that they prove to be expressive enough for many access control scenarios. All these TM systems avoid the problem of credential storage. In all these approaches it is assumed that all required credentials can be found when needed and as such they are not well-prepared to face the reality of the today's highly distributed world. In [21] Winsborough and Li identify the features a "good" language for credentials should have, one of those being the support for distributed storage. The RT family of Trust Management Languages [16, 15] is the first in which the problem of credential discovery is given an extensive treatment. In particular, in [16] , a type system is introduced in order to restrict the number of possible credential storage options. In Sect. 5 we compare the type system of RT 0 with our approach to the credential discovery problem.
Li, Grosof, and Feigenbaum in [14] developed a logic-based language, called Delegation Logic (DL), to represent policies, credentials, and requests for distributed authorisations. Monotonic version of Delegation Logic -called D1LP -is based on Logic Programming language Datalog. D1LP extends Datalog with constructs that feature delegation depth and a wide variety of complex principals.
Bertino et al. [4] introduce an XML-based trust negotiation language X -TNL used for expressing credentials and disclosure policies in the Trust-X system. Though Trust-X policies are formalised using logic rules, it also does not directly support credential discovery.
The well-known eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [19] supports the distributed policies and also provides a profile for role based access control (RBAC). However, in XACML, it is the responsibility of the Policy Decision Point (PDP) -an entity handling access requests -to know where to look for the missing attribute values in the request.
Conclusions
In this paper we introduce CoreTuLiP, a true Trust Management Language which enjoys the advantages of LP syntax and of its declarative semantics. CoreTuLiP forms the basis for the TuLiP TM language we are developing at the UT (which will include userdefined predicates and will enjoy most features of moded logic programs, including interface with other languages, debugging facilities, etc.). The main purpose of CoreTuLiP is to provide a theoretical basis for the further developments.
CoreTuLiP enjoys the advantages of trust management languages: for instance, statements may be issued by multiple authorities and be stored by authorities different from the issuing one. To deal with the problem of finding the credentials which are needed for a proof, we define the notion of traceable credentials and present a Lookup and Inference AlgoRithm (LIAR), which we show to be correct and complete w.r.t. the standard declarative semantics. We also compare CoreTuLiP with RT 0 and show that each RT 0 credential and goal translates in a straightforward way into Core TuLiP (with the small exception of the goals of Sort 3).
The theoretical relevance of this paper is that we show that it is possible to define a true TM language without leaving the well-established LP formalism. The practical relevance lies in the much greater flexibility, extendibility and accessibility that LP language enjoys with respect to -for instance -RT. As we have discussed, to accommodate various needs, the language RT 0 has developed a relatively large number of extensions, which are in our opinion often hard to grasp. We thought that this was the price we had to pay to have a true TM language, but CoreTuLiP shows that this can be done otherwise.
Future Work. CoreTuLiP can be extended in several directions. First we plan to investigate extending CoreTuLiP to support non-stratified negation. This is connected to our previous work on RT [18] , where we extend RT 0 with negation-in-context. Secondly, we are going to add support for integrity constraints for TM systems [11] . We also plan to provide an implementation for CoreTuLiP, possibly supporting the XACML standard.
